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HOW AMERICAN JUDGES INTERPRET 
THE BILL OF RIGHTS* 
Norman Dorsen** 
I 
American courts have considerable power to affect govern-
ment by exercising the power to invalidate, and thus render inop-
erative, federal and state statutes or the executive acts of federal 
and state officials (including the President himself) which they 
consider to be in conflict with a provision of the United States 
Constitution. All federal and state judges have the authority in 
appropriate cases to wield this power of judicial review, but the 
stakes are highest in the United States Supreme Court. 
Americans take the subject of judicial review very seriously. 
The recent Senate hearings into the confirmation of President 
Clinton's nominee to the Supreme Court, Judge Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, were tranquil by comparison to those that preceded 
them. From 1987 to 1991 Robert Bork, Anthony Kennedy, 
David Souter, and Clarence Thomas each underwent exhaustive 
and exhausting public grilling on their philosophies of law, their 
philosophies of life, and indeed their lives themselves. All but 
Bork eventually were confirmed by the Senate, but Thomas 
barely made it, by a vote of 52-48. The reason for the intense 
hearings was, of course, the recognition that the stakes are enor-
mous when each of the nine Supreme Court Justices represents 
one-fifth of the votes needed to determine the direction of the 
country on all sorts of basic matters. 
Judicial review in the United States is not a paper tiger. To 
take some early examples, the Supreme Court in 1857 held that 
African-American slaves had no rights under the Constitution, 
* Professor Dorsen delivered this address in Australia in August 1993, under the 
auspices of the Centre for International and Public Law and the Law Foundation of New 
South Wales, at Melbourne University Law School, at the Law School of the Australian 
National University in Canberra, and at the Human Rights and Equal Opportunities 
Commission in Sidney. It has been revised for publication. The author acknowledges the 
helpful comments on an earlier draft of Professor Julian Disney of the ANU and 
Professor Sarah Barringer Gorden of the University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
•• Stokes Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. President, 
American Civil Liberties Union 1976-1991. 
379 
380 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 11:379 
and never could have such rights.! It thereby thwarted a con-
gressional attempt to fashion a compromise on the slavery issue 
and avert a bloody Civil War. In the 1870's, following the war, 
the Supreme Court voided congressional efforts to legislate full 
citizenship for former slaves.2 
In the early twentieth century the Supreme Court regularly 
struck down federal and state social legislation that provided for 
minimum wages, maximum hours, the protection of labor unions, 
and the outlawing of child labor .3 In mid-century, the Court op-
erated with a more liberal philosophy but no less vigorously. For 
example, from 1954 to 1973 it declared unconstitutional the 
American version of racial apartheid, organized prayer in state 
schools, and laws prohibiting or restricting abortion.4 And it told 
President Harry Truman that he could not lawfully take over and 
run privately-owned steel mills when a labor dispute threatened 
the production of steel for the armed services during the Korean 
War.s 
How does one justify, or even explain, the Supreme Court's 
pattern of decision in constitutional cases so as to explain and 
perhaps justify judicial review, probably the greatest contribution 
that the United States has made to political theory and civil lib-
erty? In order to address this question, I shall begin by identify-
ing six pairs of Supreme Court rulings, in each of which the later 
decision was a radical change of direction from the earlier one. I 
shall then discuss five key factors which I believe affect judges 
when they are interpreting the Constitution, especially the Bill of 
Rights. I shall conclude by venturing some explanations, based 
on these five factors, for the changes in direction in each of the 
pairs of decisions that I have identified. 
Three of the six pairs concern equality issues under the con-
stitutional provision that prohibits government from "denying to 
any person ... the equal protection of the laws." The other three 
deal with free expression under the constitutional provision that 
prohibits government from "abridging the freedom of speech or 
of the press." 
1. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
2. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
3. Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 
45 (1905); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 
(1918). 
4. Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Engel v. Vitale, 370 
U.S. 421 (1962); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
5. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
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Thrning first to the three equality pairs, what explains the 
change from 1896, when the Supreme Court upheld the forced 
segregation of black people into "separate but equal" schools 
and other public accommodations,6 to 1954, when in Brown v. 
Board of Education it declared "separate but equal" facilities to 
be unconstitutional? Second, what explains the change from ear-
lier judicial decisions that permitted government discrimination 
on the basis of gender? to recent cases in which the Court has 
struck down almost all such inequalities?s And third, in light of 
the acknowledged constitutional protection for sexual privacy, 
what explains the Court's approval in 1986 of laws that criminal-
ize consensual homosexual sodomy?9 
As to the three "free expression" pairs, why did the 
Supreme Court uphold the convictions of Communist leaders in 
1951 for conspiracy to advocate the overthrow of the government 
by force and violence but reverse the convictions of other top 
Communists in 1957 under the same charge?to Can one recon-
cile the Court's willingness to sustain the conviction of a man for 
burning his draft registration card in protest against the Vietnam 
warn with its more recent declaration that burning the American 
flag as a political protest is constitutionally protected expres-
sion?tz Finally, why did the Court in 1952 permit Illinois to send 
a man to jail under a criminal libel law for defamation of Jews 
and blacks,B but twelve years later strike down a huge libel judg-
ment against the New York Times for printing an advertisement 
which falsely alleged that an Alabama official harrassed and ar-
rested civil rights workers without cause?t4 
There are scores of similar pairings, including cases from 
other areas of constitutional litigation such as criminal justice, 
religion and the state, the rights of private property, and the sep-
aration of powers among the branches of government. But the 
examples I have selected should suffice for present purposes. 
6. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
7. See, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948). 
8. E.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 
429 U.S. 190 (1976); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). But see Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 
U.S. 57 (1981); Michael M. v. Superior Coun of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464 (1981). 
9. Compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, with Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 
(1986). 
10. Compare Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), with Yates v. United 
States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957). 
11. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
12. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 
(1989). 
13. Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952). 
14. New York Tunes Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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Accordingly, I tum now to five factors that largely determine 
how courts interpret the Bill of Rights. 
II 
The first factor is the degree to which individual judges are 
in fact committed to the principle of judicial review. This may 
seem strange in light of the fact that the Supreme Court asserted 
the reviewing power as long ago as 1803 and its authority is now 
thoroughly established. 
But throughout American history there have been those 
who denied the validity of judicial review. Not two decades after 
Marbury a state court contended that "the foundation of every 
argument in favor of the right of the judiciary, is found, at last, to 
be an assumption of the whole ground in dispute."1s As recently 
as 1938 a well-known scholar maintained, in rather overheated 
prose, that Marshall's reasoning in Marbury was "baseless," and 
that the arguments supporting the restriction of "the will of a 
democratic majority by the judgment of a few elderly gentlemen" 
(that is, the judges) were "precisely those which the adherents of 
Hitler and Mussolini use against the frailty of democratically rep-
resentative or elective govemment."16 More recently, a leading 
federal judge, Learned Hand, lent his voice to those who 
doubted the general grant of judicial review in the Constitution, 
although he conceded at the end that it was "essential to prevent 
the defeat" of the government established in 1789 for the 
Supreme Court to assume at least some of this power.17 
The approach of Judge Hand and the other critics is consis-
tent with a long tradition that cautions the Supreme Court not to 
exercise its prerogative whenever it "sees, or thinks that it sees, 
an invasion of the Constitution. "Is In this view a court can inval-
idate a statute only when those "who have the right to make laws 
have not merely made a mistake, but have made a very clear 
one-so clear that it is not open to rational question."19 Judge 
Hand, in short, by grudgingly recognizing a right of judicial re-
view, implicitly cautioned judges to exercise the power with ex-
treme reluctance. 
15. Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawle 330, 353 (Pa. 1825) (Gibson, J., dissenting). 
16. Morris R. Cohen, The Faith of a Liberal 182-185, 192 (Henry Holt and Co., 
1946). 
17. Learned Hand, The Bill of Rights 10-15 (Harv. U. Press, 1958). 
18. ld. at 14. 
19. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitu-
tional Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129, 144 (1893). 
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This is not the occasion, nor is it necessary, to recount in 
detail the many reasons that judicial review has survived these 
assaults for almost two centuries. The arguments derive from the 
text of the Constitution and its contemporary history. They also 
stem from a perception of democratic theory which validates a 
role for a judicial body that acts both as umpire of our federal 
system and as protector of minorities and unpopular segments of 
society. 
The key point is that the freedom with which a judge ap-
proaches the question whether to nullify a statute or executive 
act turns in part on how solid a footing the judge believes judicial 
review has under the Constitution and in a democracy. In partic-
ular, if a judge believes it is inherently undemocratic to overrule 
the actions of the elected branches of government he or she will 
tend to be diffident and cautious. On the other hand, if a judge 
believes that the judiciary is an authorized ingredient of a prop-
erly functioning democracy, the judge will feel far freer in exer-
cising judicial review under the Constitution and Bill of Rights. 
III 
A second element determining how judicial review is exer-
cised concerns the appropriate technique or techniques for inter-
preting the Constitution. This factor was brought dramatically to 
the attention of Americans in 1985 by Edwin Meese, then the 
Attorney General to President Ronald Reagan. 
In a speech to the American Bar Association Mr. Meese 
said that the Reagan Justice Department "will endeavor to resur-
rect the original meaning of constitutional provisions and statutes 
as the only reliable guide for judgment."zo This statement was 
widely reported and sparked an unusual popular interest in the 
hitherto specialized subject of constitutional interpretation. It 
also stimulated a barrage of responses, including unprecedented 
reactions from two sitting Supreme Court Justices, William J. 
Brennan, Jr. and John Paul Stevens.zt 
In limiting judges solely to "original meaning," that is to the 
text and the history behind the text, Mr. Meese ignored the fact 
that the Supreme Court regularly has resorted to at least four 
20. Edwin Meese III, Speech before the American Bar Association, July 9, 1985, 
printed in The Great Debate: Interpreting Our Wrinen Constitution 1, 10 (The Federalist 
Society, 1986) (emphasis added). See also Edwin Meese III, Toward a Jurisprudence of 
Original Intent, 11 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 5, 10 (1988). 
21. William J. Brennan, Jr., Construing the Constitution, 19 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 2 
(1985); John Paul Stevens, Construing the Constitution, 19 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 15 (1985). 
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other types of justification for its decisions-arguments from the 
purposes or theory of the Constitution, arguments from the Con-
stitution's structure, arguments based on judicial precedent, and 
arguments based on moral, political, and social values. It is not 
my intention now to discuss whether the justices have employed 
these arguments well or badly, or too much or too little. It is 
rather to point out the obvious-that they have been, must be, 
and should be part of the legal intellectual capital on which the 
Court draws in deciding hard questions presented by the "great 
generalities of the Constitution," such as "due process of law," 
"equal protection of the laws," and "private property." 
The appeal to moral or social values is, of course, the most 
controversial criterion I have mentioned and the one that Mr. 
Meese would no doubt find most objectionable. But such values 
have long been employed by conservatives as well as liberals. 
For example, Justice Lewis Powell invalidated a housing ordi-
nance that restricted the right of extended families (grandparents 
and cousins as well as the nuclear family) to live together because 
"the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's his-
tory and tradition."zz Chief Justice Warren Burger in a leading 
case concluded that obscenity could be banned in the interests of 
a "decent society."z3 And in one of his last opinions, Burger held 
that high schools may punish an off-color speech by a student 
because it is the duty of schools to enforce "fundamental values," 
including "habits and manners of civility" essential to a demo-
cratic society. "24 
One need not embrace a jurisprudence of social values to 
recognize that in many, if not most, constitutional controversies it 
is simply not possible to ascertain the "original intention" of the 
authors of the document. Some issues arising today could not 
have been foreseen in the eighteenth century, others were never 
discussed, and still others were the objects of conflicting "inten-
tions" both at the Constitutional Convention in 1787 that pro-
posed the Constitution and at the state conventions that ratified 
it. Furthermore, the records of the debates at the Convention 
are incomplete and possibly inaccurate. That is why James 
Madison deliberately delayed the publication of his notes on the 
Convention until after his death, asserting that as a guide to ex-
22. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977). 
23. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49,69 (1973) (quotingJacobellis v. Ohio, 
378 U.S. 184, 199 (1964) (Warren, C.J., dissenting)). 
24. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986), quoting Charles 
Beard and Mary Beard, New Basic History of the United States 228 (Doubleday, 1968). 
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pounding and applying the provisions of the Constitution, the de-
bates lacked any authoritative character.2s 
The upshot of all this is that we can't stop the world and get 
off. The Constitution must be interpreted by contemporary 
judges in the only way they can-as citizens of the late twentieth 
century. Among others, Justice Benjamin Cardozo expressed 
this thought when he said that the "great generalities of the con-
stitution have a content and a significance that vary from age to 
age. "26 Earlier, Chief Justice Marshall recognized the principle, 
in words no less true for being familiar, when he described the 
Constitution as an instrument "intended to endure for ages to 
come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of 
human affairs."21 Almost a century later the Supreme Court 
said, "[t]ime works changes, brings into existence new conditions 
and purposes. Therefore a principle to be vital must be capable 
of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth. This is 
peculiarly true of constitutions."2s There are many such authori-
tative statements. 
Finally, it is important to observe that Mr. Meese-unlike 
some other textualists-had a political agenda. Justice Brennan 
perceived this clearly. In replying to Meese he said that "while 
proponents of this facile historicism justify it as a depoliticization 
of the judiciary, the political underpinnings of such a choice 
should not escape notice."29 The nature of Mr. Meese's political 
agenda is apparent, namely, to resolve the Constitution's textual 
ambiguities against claims of individual right. By skewing all in-
quiry toward a spurious "original intention," Mr. Meese would 
require the rejection of any civil liberties claim that could not be 
supported by hard evidence from the late eighteenth century. 
Such evidence is very difficult to come by, not only because of 
the problems associated with ascertaining "original intention," 
but also because concepts concerning the individual's relation to 
the state differed drastically at that time. There is no warrant for 
such a crabbed view of constitutional interpretation. 
25. See Paul D. Carrington, Meaning and Professionalism in American Law, 10 
Const. Comm. 297, 298-99 (1993). 
26. Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 17 (Yale U. Press, 
1921). 
27. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819). 
28. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910). 
29. See Brennan, 19 U.C. Davis L. Rev. at 5 (cited in note 21). 
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IV 
A third factor relates to the strength of a judge's commit-
ment to the values underlying particular sections of the Bill of 
Rights. To illustrate, no Justice of the Supreme Court would be-
little the institution of private property as a bedrock of the capi-
talist free enterprise economy or as an important basis for 
individual security and independence. Yet the Justices vary con-
siderably in their willingness to tolerate government regulations 
of business and other forms of property. These decisions reflect, 
at least in part, different levels of attachment to the property 
principle. 
Another example concerns free expression. In the course of 
many years of academic discourse and courtroom combat relat-
ing to free speech, I rarely have found a person who openly dep-
recates its worth. To the contrary, everyone professes to support 
free speech, much as everyone claims to have a good sense of 
humor, and to be open-minded. Why, then, the sharp differences 
among judges in their protection of free speech under the First 
Amendment? The difference turns not merely on whether a 
judge supports free speech, but rather on the degree to which he 
or she does so. Intensity of this sort cannot be measured, but it is 
palpable in some judicial opinions and not in others-as it is in 
the books and articles of some scholars and not others. It stems 
from a deep source within each person, where basic values re-
side. As the late Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart observed 
about hard-core pornography, one knows it when one sees it. 
A final example of this point focuses on a prominent 
Supreme Court Justice, Felix Frankfurter, who served from 1939 
to 1962. When Frankfurter was appointed to the Court from a 
professorship at Harvard Law School, the liberal community 
rejoiced. For instance, the editor of a leading liberal magazine, 
The Nation, said, "I must record my profound gratitude to Presi-
dent Roosevelt for the appointment of Felix Frankfurter. . . . I 
do not believe that in my lifetime anyone has been appointed to 
the bench who was better qualified or more truly liberal."3° 
Yet Frankfurter confounded the liberals (and nearly every-
one else) by becoming the leading exponent of judicial restraint 
of his era. Again and again he led the Court in conservative rul-
ings relating to free speech, criminal justice, and equal protec-
tion, or he dissented from liberal decisions in these and other 
areas. But there were three principal exceptions to his restrained 
30. Oswald Garrison Villard, Issues and Men, 148 Nation 94 (1939). 
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approach-separation of church and state under the Establish-
ment Clause was one, academic freedom was a second, and the 
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures under the 
Fourth Amendment was the third. In those areas Frankfurter 
was an aggressive liberal, consistently upholding individual 
claims against the government. This inconsistency is explained 
by Frankfurter's special commitment to the values underlying 
these constitutional guarantees. The commitment arose in the 
first instance because of personal experience as a member of a 
minority religion, in the second because of his decades as a pro-
fessor, and in the third in his capacity as intellectual heir to his 
mentor Justice Louis Brandeis's devotion to the right to privacy, 
the "right to be let alone."3t 
v 
A fourth thread in the judges' tapestry is possibly even more 
imponderable than the intensity factor. Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes stated the idea, in his characteristically Olympian way, 
when he said that the "felt necessities of the time"32 were critical 
determinants in the development of law. It has been put more 
defensively by others such as Professor Alexander Bickel, who 
said that "a court that decided the equivalent of five cases such as 
Brown v. Board of Educ. in a single year would have seen the 
end of the institution, I am sure."33 The common element in 
these remarks is that public opinion has a powerful effect on 
judges, including Supreme Court Justices, even though lifetime 
tenure insulates them from crass retribution for their decisions. 
Public opinion may be transitory or may reflect a more general 
cultural context in which a decision is rendered. 
31. Justice Brandeis's devotion to privacy norms was manifested early. See Samuel 
D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 193 (1890) 
("[N]ow the right to life has come to mean the right to enjoy life,-the right to be let 
alone"). See also Olmstead v. United States, 217 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting). In contexts other than the Fourth Amendment, Justice Frankfurter had a more 
limited attachment to privacy values. See, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 
(1959) (freedom of association) and Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958) (privilege 
against self-incrimination). 
32. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 1 (Little, Brown and Co., 1881). 
The full sentence from which this phrase is taken is central to the thesis of this paper: 
"The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of 
public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their 
fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules 
by which men should be governed." I d. 
33. Anhur Garfield Hays Conference: The Proper Role of the United States Supreme 
Coun in Civil Libenies Cases, 10 Wayne L. Rev. 457, 476 (Norman Dorsen ed., 1964). 
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A perceptive formulation of this point was rendered by 
James L. Oakes, a judge of the same court of which Learned 
Hand was a member. Judge Oakes wrote: 
It is also a bit of a myth to think that lifetime tenure oper-
ates to create irresponsibility. Lives are short; reputations are 
meaningful. There is, I venture to suggest, hardly an institu-
tion that operates with so many built-in checks and balances 
capable of instant criticism: one's fellow judges, higher courts, 
lower courts, law professors, law reviews, law writers, law 
clerks, lawyers' associations, families, and, yes, to an ever 
greater and more professional extent, the press. All or almost 
all of our actions are matters of public record; most of the rea-
sons for taking them are openly and publicly stated for all to 
see and to criticize.34 
Judge Oakes concluded that "the legitimacy of judicial solution 
to many of the most perplexing problems of the day must be, and 
is, ultimately supported by the accountability of the judiciary to 
the people. "35 
Put another way, judges (especially Justices of the United 
States Supreme Court) do not live in a disembodied vacuum, but 
exist as part of the hard real world where their decisions will be 
closely reviewed by every segment of society and ultimately re-
dound to each judge's enhanced or impaired reputation. This is 
bound to influence decision-making. 
VI 
The fifth and final consideration is the degree to which 
judges are sensitive to the core purpose of the Constitution. This 
is very different from deciphering the meaning of a particular 
clause or word. Rather it is a question of commitment to the 
Constitution's general purposes. These purposes are stated mov-
ingly in its Preamble: "to form a more perfect union, establish 
justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common de-
fense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of 
liberty" for all posterity. In human terms, the desire to "establish 
justice" and "secure the blessings of liberty" is the ultimate goal 
of the Constitution. Government efficiency, international influ-
ence, domestic order and economic needs are all important, but 
none exceeds justice and liberty as the heart of the constitutional 
commitment to the people of the United States. 
34. James L. Oakes, The Proper Role of the Federal Courts in Enforcing the Bill of 
Rights, 54 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 911, 948-49 (1979). 
35. ld. at 949. 
1994] JUDGES AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 389 
This conclusion is confirmed by many reliable indicia of con-
stitutional purpose. The first is the structure of the Constitution, 
which protects individual liberty through the dispersion of power 
among the branches of government, thereby adopting Montes-
quieu's insight that liberty cannot exist if the judiciary is not sep-
arated from the legislative and executive.36 
The second is the text of the Constitution, which as origi-
nally ratified and promptly amended by the Bill of Rights pro-
tects liberty in numerous provisions. In this connection, it is of 
prime importance that without promises from the Federalists-
the majority party at the time-that a bill of rights would be ad-
ded as soon as a government was installed, the Constitution al-
most surely would not have been ratified by the states. 
Third, the Federalist Papers, which provide the best contem-
porary discussion of the theory of the Constitution, are replete 
with concern for individual justice and the interests of minorities. 
For example, in one issue Madison referred to the "preservation 
of liberty" as the essence of government. In another, he spoke of 
the need for "measures" to be decided "according to the rules of 
justice and the rights of the minor party," and not "by the supe-
rior force of an interested and overbearing majority."J7 
Despite several references to "the minority" in the Federal-
ist Papers, we should appreciate that "equality" was not upper-
most in the minds of the Framers of the Constitution. All the 
delegates to the Constitutional Convention were men, and wo-
men hardly were mentioned in the debates. Slavery was counte-
nanced in three clauses of the Constitution, although the word 
itself never appeared. As the late Justice Thurgood Marshall 
wrote when the bicentennial of the Constitution was celebrated 
in 1987, even after the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 guaran-
teed equal protection of the laws to blacks as well as to whites, 
"almost another century would pass before any significant recog-
nition was obtained of the rights of black Americans to share 
equally even in such basic opportunities as education, housing, 
and employment, and to have their votes counted, and counted 
equally. "Js 
Whether one admires the handiwork of the Framers of the 
Constitution without reservation, or regards it as partially flawed 
36. See generally Charles Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (Thomas Nugent 
trans., Hafner, 1949). 
37. The Federalist No. 51 at 321 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., New Amer-
ican Library, 1961); The Federalist No. 10, id. at 77 (James Madison). 
38. Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitu-
tion, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1987). 
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or incomplete, it is plain that a great danger to liberty-perhaps 
the greatest danger-lies in what Madison called "the commu-
nity," that is, the majority. The conservative English writer Ed-
mund Burke concurred with this sentiment at almost the same 
time, saying that in a "democracy the majority of citizens is capa-
ble of exercising the most cruel oppressions upon the minor-
ity."39 Madison's essential premise was that even in a democracy 
the majority must be subject to limits that assure individual lib-
erty, and that the democratic political process requires a check 
through a politically insulated body in order to guarantee the 
right of individuals, including the most obnoxious, to vote, to 
speak, and to be treated fairly and with equal respect and dignity. 
A judge's attachment, or lack thereof, to these general pur-
poses and principles will powerfully affect his or her rulings in 
particular cases. 
VII 
While recognizing that a far more extensive analysis would 
be required to do full justice to the six pairs of rulings that intro-
duced the discussion, it is nevertheless time to apply my general 
observations about how judges approach the Bill of Rights to 
these concrete settings. 
The first pair comprised two segregation cases. In 1896, 
when the Supreme Court legitimized apartheid, judicial review 
on behalf of individual rights was still undeveloped, meaning that 
few of the Justices saw their role as protector of the Bill of 
Rights. Further, it is unlikely that any one of the Justices but the 
dissenting John Marshall Harlan accepted the extensive govern-
mental intervention that would be necessary to bring the freed 
slaves fully into American life. Finally, by that time the white 
backlash to the Civil War and its egalitarian impulses had be-
come settled public policy, making it easy for the Court to ignore 
the central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Pro-
tection Clause (let alone the general purpose of the Constitution 
to protect individual rights). 
In contrast, by 1954 when Brown v. Board of Education was 
decided, there was a much firmer sense in American society of 
the Equal Protection Clause's general principle, and there were 
many members of the Court committed to racial equality. The 
Second World War and its aftermath contributed greatly to 
change and-also in the category of the "felt necessities of the 
39. Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France 139 (Doubleday, 1989). 
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times" -the Cold War competition with the Soviet Union and 
China rendered the system of racial stratification highly embar-
rassing to American interests abroad. This was pointed out in 
the Eisenhower Administration's amicus curiae brief to the 
Supreme Court. 
The second pair involved decisions in relation to women's 
rights. The enhanced constitutional protection of women's rights 
beginning in 197140 was also heavily influenced by the times, in 
particular the rise of the women's movement at the end of the 
1960's. This factor was of critical importance because it could not 
be claimed that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment (ratified in 1868) was intended to provide special 
protection for women. Furthermore, at least three Justices-
William 0. Douglas, William J. Brennan, and Thurgood Mar-
shall-were thoroughly committed both to the general liberty 
purposes of the Constitution as well as to the specific agenda of 
female equality. Most of the other Justices recognized that the 
idea's time had come. 
Thrning to our third pair of cases, it is hard to understand 
why the Court upheld the sodomy conviction of a homosexual, 
albeit by a narrow 5-4 vote.4t After all, the gay rights movement 
was fully organized by 1986, when the decision was rendered, and 
there were several strong civil libertarians on the Court. 
The explanation for Bowers v. Hardwick has several strands. 
Initially, the case was pressed on the same sexual privacy theory 
that had been used successfully in the abortion rights cases; by 
the mid-1980's four Justices rejected the abortion decisions and 
were unwilling to extend them further in any direction. Second, 
there has always been in American culture a deep antipathy to-
wards homosexuals. This antipathy surfaced most recently in the 
bitter and largely unsuccessful legislative struggle to accord lesbi-
ans and gay men equal rights in the military. Finally, the fright-
ening AIDS epidemic that was relatively new in 1986 cast a harsh 
light on homosexual lifestyles and severely prejudiced their 
claims for equal treatment. Despite these rationales, the case ap-
parently was decided by a hair because one of the five member 
majority, Justice Lewis Powell, said soon after his retirement that 
he had long agonized over Bowers v. Hardwick and concluded 
later that he had made a mistake.42 
40. See Reed, 404 U.S. 71. 
41. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
42. See Anand Agneshwar, Ex-Justice Says He May Have Been Wrong, Nat'l. L.J. 
Nov. 5, 1990 at 3. 
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The first pair of "free expression" cases was the two prose-
cutions of Communist leaders. In 1951, at the heart of the Cold 
War, a large majority of the Supreme Court expressly doubted 
their capacity, as judges, to second guess the Congress on matters 
of national security.43 In other words, the justices lacked confi-
dence in the authority of judicial review in these circumstances. 
Six years later, with a waning of McCarthyism at home (including 
the eclipse and death of Senator Joe McCarthy) and a softening 
of international tension after the death of Joseph Stalin, the 
Court eased its stance and imposed heavy restrictions on conspir-
acy prosecutions of Communists that effectively ended such pros-
ecutions.44 By that time, too, Earl Warren was Chief Justice and 
there were four strong civil libertarians on the Court; the shift to 
a generally more protective view of individual rights was well on 
the way. 
The next pair comprised the draft-card and flagburning deci-
sions, which are so similar doctrinally. Like the Communist 
cases, they are partly explicable by national security concerns or, 
more precisely, the public's emotional reaction to war. In 1969, 
when the Supreme Court upheld the law prohibiting public de-
struction of a draft card,45 most members of the Court were dedi-
cated to principles of civil liberty and to freedom of expression, 
and none of them would have agreed with Edwin Meese's nar-
row approach to the Constitution. Thus, their unwillingness to 
protect a pyrotechnic protest, unlike the liberal decision invali-
dating the flag-burning statute two decades later, was rooted 
elsewhere. In my opinion, that root was the Court's belief in 
1969 that public opinion was offended by the widespread and vig-
orous opposition to the Vietnam war and, more generally, by the 
flamboyant 1960's counterculture. Consequently, it feared ero-
sion of the Court's standing with the public on a matter which 
was highly emotional but relatively minor, certainly in compari-
son with the Warren Court's broader agenda. 
By contrast, in our final pairing public opinion was far less of 
a factor. In 1952, when the Supreme Court upheld the Illinois 
statute that proscribed group defamation of Jews and blacks,46 
few people were aroused by the controversy. In 1964, when the 
Court reversed the Alabama libel judgment against the New 
43. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
44. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957). See also Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 
u.s. 444 (1969). 
45. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367. 
46. See Beauhamais, 343 U.S. 250. 
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York Times,47 the public was divided over the civil rights move-
ment which had precipitated the incident leading to the inaccu-
rate advertisement. The different results in the two cases seem to 
tum on the far greater commitment of the later Supreme Court 
to the principle of free speech, even when the words insult indi-
viduals or vulnerable groups. This is an illustration of the inten-
sity factor: the 1964 Court was willing to subordinate the 
competing values of personal reputation and possible civic strife 
to the freedom of expression protected by the First Amendment. 
VIII 
The variety and complexity of the issues that arise under the 
Bill of Rights defy easy categorization or synthesis. In presenting 
a series of considerations that seem to me important to judges, I 
am acutely conscious of the incompleteness of the analysis. The 
cases discussed represent only a portion of constitutional 
problems. Moreover, I have not alluded to the complexities in-
troduced by precedent (including stare decisis) or by issues of 
statutory construction and administrative law that are inter-
twined with constitutional law. I have eschewed these topics be-
cause discussion of precedent as well as statutory and 
administrative issues would take us far afield. Despite these 
omissions I hope that I illuminated in some small way the awe-
some power of judicial review. 
47. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254. 
